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I. INTRODUCTION
 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the “privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by” the government.1 But under the 
third-party doctrine, first articulated in the 1970s,2 when someone voluntarily 
provides information to a third party, they risk losing that protection because the 
government is permitted to access the information from the third party without a 
warrant.3 In today’s digital world, personal information maintained by third parties 
is all-encompassing and voluminous;4 until relatively recently, access to information 
of this nature and in such volume by third parties was unimaginable.5
1. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. 
of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 350 (1967) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain 
kinds of governmental intrusion”). The Fourth Amendment provides
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
 U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although the Constitution does not directly provide for a fundamental right of 
privacy, “[t]he Court used the personal protections expressly stated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Ninth Amendments to find that there is an implied right to privacy in the Constitution.” Privacy, 
Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). This Note 
focuses on the Fourth Amendment.
2. Richard M. Thompson II, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43586, The Fourth Amendment Third-Party 
Doctrine 9 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43586.pdf. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735 (1979) (reviewing whether the third-party doctrine applied to phone call records maintained by a 
telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (analyzing bank documents under the 
third-party doctrine).
3. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (“The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an 
individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.”).
4. John Villasenor, What You Need to Know about the Third-Party Doctrine, The Atlantic (Dec. 30, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-third-
party-doctrine/282721/. For example, Facebook collects personal data obtained through artificial 
intelligence that analyzes the behavior of Facebook’s users and non-users to provide targeted 
advertisements. Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data, N.Y. Times 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html. 
Similarly, retailers track their customers’ online activities, including whether customers “click on any of 
the links inside the email[s]” they sent, the number of visits to their websites, purchases through their 
loyalty card programs, and even customer shirt sizes and preferences. Your Data Is Shared and Sold…
What’s Being Done About It?, Knowledge @ Wharton (Oct. 28, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edu/article/data-shared-sold-whats-done/.
5. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(noting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the [1970s] premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” because, in today’s digital 
age, “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks”).
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 In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court held in 2018 that the government 
must obtain a warrant to access historical cell-site location information (CSLI),6 but 
opted not to extend that requirement to other, similar types of location-based 
tracking data maintained by many third parties.7 Specifically, the Court in Carpenter 
did not extend Fourth Amendment privacy protections to emerging forms of real-
time data or tracking technologies, which convey private information to third parties 
such as Apple.8 Carpenter was the perfect opportunity for the Court to eradicate the 
third-party doctrine, as necessitated by the development of novel technologies.9 
Instead, the Court tackled the narrow issue of CSLI only, leaving other voluminous 
private information potentially exposed to warrantless searches by the government.10
 The third-party doctrine is outdated and undermines Fourth Amendment 
protections as applied to today’s digital technologies, which, often more coercively 
than voluntarily, convey so much of our information to third parties.11 The mere fact 
6. “Cell phones perform their . . . functions by connecting to a set of radio antennas,” typically mounted on 
towers, f lagpoles, or buildings, called “cell sites.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. “Cell phones continuously 
scan their environment for the signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site.” Id. “Each time a 
phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record [of its location,] known as cell-site 
location information (CSLI).” Id. CSLI data may be generated by a user’s intentional actions (e.g., 
calling, texting, or even just turning the phone on), or automatically without an intentional action (e.g., 
“when a phone receives a text message or when the phone sends periodic updates to the network”). 
Sabrina McCubbin, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Carpenter v. United States, Lawfare (June 
22, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-supreme-court-rules-carpenter-v-united-states.
7. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (describing the decision as “a narrow one” that focuses on “the unique 
nature of cell phone location information” and does not address “real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps,’” 
“conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras,” or “other business records 
that might incidentally reveal location information”). Specifically, the Court stated that “accessing 
seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.” Id. at 2217 n.3. “Because Carpenter 
involved records acquired from cell phone companies, the third-party doctrine was [essential] to the 
government” to obtain the information without a warrant. McCubbin, supra note 6.
8. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; Daniel R. Stroller, Location Data Privacy Protection Expanding in Judges’ 
Hands, Bloomberg (Aug. 21, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/
location-data-privacy-protection-expanding-in-judges-hands. For example, enabling location services on 
your Apple Watch allows Apple and other third-party apps and websites to automatically collect and use 
information based on your current location. Location Services & Privacy, Apple (Sept. 18, 2020), https://
support.apple.com/en-us/HT207056 (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
9. See Daniel Solove, Carpenter v. United States, Cell Phone Location Records, and the Third Party Doctrine, 
TeachPrivacy (July 1, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/carpenter-v-united-states-cell-phone-location-
records-and-the-third-party-doctrine/ (“[T]he Supreme Court finally took a step forward to bring the 
Fourth Amendment more in line with the digital age. But this was only a step in the year 2018, when 
the Court should have walked more than a mile.”).
10. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3. The Court should have broadened its holding to find that an individual 
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of their physical movements as captured 
through all location-based data, such as that generated by an Apple Watch. But see id. at 2217 (“[A]n 
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the recording of his physical movements as 
captured through CSLI [only].”).
11. Solove, supra note 9; see also Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party 
Disclosures, 11 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 321, 326 (2013) (recognizing that when companies notify 
consumers that their information may be disclosed, “this notice . . . comes in the form of a blanket opt-in/
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that a third party holds someone’s information should not supersede constitutional 
protections.12 The Founders’ “papers” and “effects” in the Fourth Amendment have 
been interpreted as f lexible, all-encompassing terms, and the third-party doctrine 
should not apply to their modern-day equivalents.13 Further, the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is to limit the government’s information gathering abilities 
when serious privacy considerations are involved.14 However, the third-party doctrine 
does not require the government to establish probable cause when many novel 
technologies are at play.15 The courts should reconstruct the third-party doctrine to 
accommodate the realities of our time.16
 This Note contends that courts should eliminate the outdated third-party 
doctrine and apply a modern-day version of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, as articulated in 1967 in Katz v. United States, with respect to (1) information 
that could infringe upon privacy inside the home and (2) real-time location-based 
tracking data.17 Part II of this Note provides a historical overview of the third-party 
opt-out approach” that leaves consumers “with little to no control over their information”). For example, 
individuals wishing to use social media provide data to companies like Facebook and Instagram by 
agreeing to their complex user agreements; however, no one can negotiate these agreements and rarely 
anyone reads them. See David Berreby, Click To Agree With What? No One Reads Terms of Services, Studies 
Confirm, The Guardian (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/03/terms-
of-service-online-contracts-fine-print. As a result, users are faced with a “take it or leave it” choice of 
either forgoing their expectations of privacy in exhange for access to these platforms or prioritizing their 
privacy interests and forgoing access to these platforms. See Asay, supra.
12. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
13. See Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. of 
Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 247, 271 (2016) (arguing that “the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
require a f lexible reading of ‘papers’ that would encompass clear categories of potentially expressive and 
associational data” and that should include “personal files stored in the cloud, . . . communications data[,] 
and metadata”); see also Solove, supra note 9 (“The fact that the Fourth Amendment mentions physical 
things . . . is because there weren’t digital records at the time. The list of ‘persons, houses, papers, and 
effects’ is meant to be a broad inclusive list . . . .”).
14. Solove, supra note 9.
15. See id. (“[T]he Third Party Doctrine is deeply f lawed and eviscerates Fourth Amendment protection in 
today’s digital age where so much of our information is in the hands of third parties.”); see also Steven J. 
Arango, The Third-Party Doctrine in the Wake of a “Seismic Shift”, Am. Bar Ass’n (June 13, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/privacy-data-security/practice/2019/third-
party-doctrine-wake-of-seismic-shift/ (arguing that “Congress needs to address cloud privacy with 
legislation” by “[r]equiring probable cause and a warrant to access this information”).
16. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 894–96 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), that it is for 
the courts to design an updated Fourth Amendment doctrine, not the legislature), rev’d and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
17. See 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, which was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court). To determine whether government 
conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment, there are two requirements to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy: first, “that a person . . . exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. 
(parenthesis in original).
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doctrine and Part III discusses the ways in which the doctrine is outdated today. Part 
IV sets forth the modern-day test and Part V concludes this Note.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
 The Fourth Amendment has two operative portions: (1) it protects individuals 
from unreasonable searches and seizures and (2) it requires the government to obtain 
a warrant supported by probable cause in order to search and seize.18 Determining 
when these privacy protections apply is informed by the understandings of what was 
considered an unreasonable search at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted.19 
Historically, law has recognized that the Fourth Amendment sought “to secure the 
‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”20 Thus, the Founders’ central aim was to 
restrain the government from trampling on these privacies without limitation.21
 Throughout much of America’s history, the Fourth Amendment was connected 
to common law trespass; courts focused on whether the government physically 
intruded into a constitutionally protected area, triggering warrant requirements.22 
However, in 1967, the Supreme Court recognized in Katz v. United States that the 
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”23 The Court expanded its 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by holding that wiretapping a public phone 
booth constituted an unreasonable search.24 Importantly, Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s Katz concurrence, later adopted by the Supreme Court, articulated a two-
prong test to determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment, thereby restraining the government from conducting 
unreasonable warrantless searches.25 That test examines (1) whether the individual 
had a subjective belief that they enjoyed a privacy interest, and (2) whether society 
18. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
19. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018).
20. Id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
21. Id. at 2213 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)) (“The Founding generation crafted 
the Fourth Amendment as a ‘response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the 
colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for 
evidence of criminal activity.’”).
22. Id. at 2213 (citation omitted).
23. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
24. See id. at 350–51, 358–59 (holding that a trespass was not dispositive for finding a Fourth Amendment 
violation). In Katz, the FBI suspected that Charles Katz was engaged in illegal gambling and planted a 
listening device outside a public phone booth from which he often placed calls. Id. at 348. As a result, 
the FBI recorded Katz’s phone call conversations and subsequently convicted Katz for transmitting 
wagering information in violation of federal law. Id.
25. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing that searches of constitutionally protected areas are 
“presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant” and discussing the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (expressly adopting the two-
prong test articulated in the Katz concurrence).
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recognizes that belief to be valid and legitimate.26 Under this test, satisfaction of 
both prongs is required to establish a constitutional violation of a privacy interest.27
 In 1976, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Miller that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prevent the government from obtaining information revealed 
voluntarily to a third-party bank.28 The Miller Court reasoned that a depositor who 
reveals his business affairs to a bank assumes the risk that the information may be 
conveyed to the government.29 Further, in 1979, the Court stated in Smith v. 
Maryland that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information 
[they] voluntarily turn over to [a third party].”30 In Smith, the police, without a 
warrant, requested that the telephone company install a pen register31 to record the 
numbers dialed from Michael Lee Smith’s phone.32 Like the Miller Court, the Smith 
Court reasoned that a telephone user assumes the risk that the telephone company 
could reveal the dialed numbers to the police.33
26. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
27. Id. The Katz Court concluded that Katz expected his telephone conversation to remain private because 
he closed the telephone booth door behind him, and that such expectation was objectively reasonable 
because “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has 
come to play in private communication.” See id. at 352 (majority opinion) (“One who occupies [a telephone 
booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to 
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”).
28. 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976). The Court found that “[a]ll of the documents obtained . . . contain only 
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business,” and further stated that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from 
obtaining such information “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used 
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” Id. 
Mitchell Miller was convicted of, among others, intent to defraud the government of an alcohol tax, 
possessing alcohol without paying taxes, and conspiring to defraud the government of tax revenues. Id. 
at 436. The government used the bank records to support its contention that Miller committed overt 
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud the government. Id. at 438. The Court concluded that 
the government did not violate Miller’s expectation of privacy and that obtaining bank records Miller 
had voluntarily turned over to the bank was not a search. Id. at 442–45.
29. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)).
30. 442 U.S. at 743–44 (citations omitted).
31. “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the 
electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral 
communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.” United States v. N.Y. Tel. 
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977).
32. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. The pen register in Smith recorded only outgoing phone numbers dialed, not the 
communications themselves. Id. at 741 (quoting N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167). Police installed the pen 
register after a robbery victim received threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying 
himself as the robber, who fit the description of Smith. Id. at 737. The Court held that the police did 
not need a warrant to monitor Smith’s outgoing call log. See id. at 741–46 (analyzing the warrantless 
installation of a pen register under the reasonable expectation of privacy test).
33. Id. at 744.
265
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 65 | 2020/21
 Miller and Smith formulated what is today known as the third-party doctrine:34 
when an individual “voluntarily provides information to a third party, the Fourth 
Amendment does not preclude the government from accessing [such information] 
without a warrant.”35 The rationale behind this doctrine is that the individual 
assumes the risk that such information will be disclosed to others and that, therefore, 
it need not be protected by the Fourth Amendment from warrantless government 
searches.36
 The third-party doctrine remained relatively unscathed until 2012, when the 
Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones.37 There, the Court held that the 
installation of a GPS tracking device on Antoine Jones’ vehicle, without a warrant, 
constituted an unlawful trespass and therefore a search.38 Although the holding in 
Jones did not directly address the third-party doctrine, the respective concurrences of 
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Samuel Alito questioned whether the third-party 
doctrine is still appropriate given today’s digital landscape.39 Specifically, the Justices 
were concerned that the prolonged monitoring of an individual’s location infringes 
upon our reasonable expectation of privacy in public movements.40
34. Villasenor, supra note 4.
35. Id.; see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018).
36. Caitlin Campbell, Mixed Signals: An Analysis of the Third-Party Doctrine as Applied to Warrantless 
Collection of Historical Cell Site Location Information, Ark. J. Soc. Change & Pub. Serv. (Apr. 4, 2018) 
(footnote omitted), https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2018/04/04/mixed-signals-analysis-third-party-
doctrine-applied-warrantless-collection-historical-cell-site-location-information/; see also Smith, 442 
U.S. at 744 (noting that confiding information to a third party “on the assumption that it will be used 
only for a limited purpose” does not offer protection under the Fourth Amendment when that third 
party betrays such confidence).
37. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
38. See id. at 404–05. The Court in Jones clarified that any situation in which there was no trespass would 
remain subject to the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis set forth in Katz. Id. at 411.
39. See id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance 
that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may 
provide little guidance.”); see also id. at 427–30 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that a search occurs when 
police surveillance of an individual’s activity, even a public one, is prolonged and pervasive).
40. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor stated:
I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded 
and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at 
will, their political and religious beliefs [and] sexual habits . . . . I would also consider 
the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from 
a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth 
Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power and prevent ‘a too 
permeating police surveillance[.]’
 Id. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Alito observed that the best way to 
determine whether law enforcement infringed on an individual’s expectation of privacy is to “apply 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case 
involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” Id. at 430 (Alito, J., 
concurring).
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 In 2018, the Supreme Court considered in Carpenter whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant before accessing historical 
CSLI data maintained by a third party.41 The Court held that the government 
needed a warrant to access such data, but failed to extend that warrant requirement 
to other technologies.42 The majority in Carpenter recognized that “personal location 
information maintained by a third party . . . does not fit neatly” into the existing 
Jones, Miller, and Smith jurisprudence.43 However, the holding in Carpenter was rather 
limited; the Court did not address other potential forms of technology that the 
government could obtain data from without a warrant, such as social media accounts, 
dating apps, bankcards, and nanny cams, all of which penetrate deeply into an 
individual’s intimate sphere and risk violating their privacy interests.44
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
 As a result of Carpenter, courts have little guidance on whether real-time location 
data and other emerging tracking technologies deserve the same Fourth Amendment 
41. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). Prior to trial, Timothy Carpenter moved to 
suppress the CSLI records, arguing that the government’s seizure of CSLI violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights because the information was obtained without a warrant supported by probable 
cause. Id. at 2212. The District Court disagreed and denied the motion. Id. The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that Carpenter “lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that 
information with his wireless carriers.” Id. at 2213. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the business 
records resulting from voluntarily conveyed cell-site data to wireless carriers are not entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection. Id.
42. Id. at 2219–20. Specifically, the Court acknowledged that the Stored Communications Act, which 
“require[s] the [g]overnment to show ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing the [CSLI] records [are] 
‘relevant and material to an ongoing investigation,’” is not a permissible mechanism for compelling a 
wireless carrier to turn over CSLI to the government. Id. at 2221 (quoting U.S.C. § 2703(d)). However, 
the Court did not address whether accessing less than seven days of CSLI would constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, nor whether accessing similar data obtained via other technologies 
deserves any Fourth Amendment protections. See id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for leaving it to law enforcement to “guess how much of that information can be requested 
before a warrant is required” and for “expressing no opinion on ‘real-time CSLI,’ tower dumps, and 
security-camera footage[,]” leaving unanswered the question of “whether greater or lesser thresholds 
should apply to information like IP addresses or website browsing history”).
43. See id. at 2214–17 (majority opinion). The Court struggled to classify the information at issue and noted 
that it lies at the intersection of Jones (whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or 
her location), and Smith and Miller (whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy once it is 
turned over to a third party). Id.
44. See id. at 2220 (stating that “[t]his decision is narrow” and “do[es] not express a view on matters not 
before [the Court,]” nor does it “disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question 
conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras,” “[n]or do[es it] address other 
business records that might incidentally reveal location information . . . [or] other collection techniques 
involving foreign affairs or national security”); see also Solove, supra note 9 (“The [Carpenter] Court 
treats [CSLI records] as if they were cutting-edge technological issues. In fact, they are rather old 
technological issues. A larger problem with the decision is that it fails to provide much guidance about 
when the Third Party Doctrine would apply in other contexts.”).
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protections as historical CSLI.45 This uncertainty means that, by allowing third 
parties to access such other data, users open the door for the government to obtain it 
from third parties without a warrant.46
 It would be highly impractical to participate in modern society without revealing 
personal data to third-party service providers.47 Disclosures of private information 
are necessary to navigate our daily lives and perform basic functions like online 
banking, communicating via smartphones, or purchasing goods with credit cards.48 
It is difficult to argue that using such conveniences is voluntary when they are almost 
ubiquitous and alternatives are scarce.49 Therefore, in essence, the third-party 
doctrine serves as a contract of adhesion—users may choose to either enjoy privacy 
protections or ‘sign the contract,’ forfeit privacy protections, and gain access to digital 
technologies.50 Courts have held that a contract will not be enforced if it would 
impose an unreasonable restriction on a person’s right to exercise their living.51 But 
shouldn’t individuals retain their Fourth Amendment protections when navigating 
daily life with a little help from cell phones, dating sites, or ATMs?
 Significant privacy issues also surround the effect that the third-party doctrine 
has on privacy in the home, which is intimate and should be safe from warrantless 
45. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220, 2222; see also Stroller, supra note 8. The Court in Jones solidified its 
holding using “a trespass theory in which attaching . . . the GPS device was a trespass to Jones’s property 
under the Fourth Amendment, which for many observers was a convenient solution to an increasingly 
thorny third-party problem.” Michael Bahar et al., Third-Party Party-Crashing? The Fate of the Third-
Party Doctrine, Lawfare (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/third-party-party-crashing-
fate-third-party-doctrine. Real-time (or live) location data has the capability of revealing an individual’s 
specific location in real time, whereas historical data tracks and stores past movements and locations. 
Live GPS Tracking vs. Historical GPS Data Logging, XtremeTrakGPS, https://www.xtremetrakgps.
com/live-gps-tracking-vs-historical-gps-data-logging.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
46. Josephine Wolff, Opinion, Losing Our Fourth Amendment Data Protection, N.Y. Times (Apr. 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/28/opinion/fourth-amendment-privacy.html.
47. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 525 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
48. Id. (citations omitted) (“[U]nder the third-party doctrine, ‘unless a person is prepared to forgo use of 
what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of 
surveillance.’”).
49. See Campbell, supra note 36 (“Such conveyance [of information to third-party service providers] cannot 
be voluntary if society does not afford the option to forego [sic] a device that automatically conveys one’s 
sensitive location information.”).
50. See Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 208 (Am. L. Inst. 2020) (“If a contract or term thereof is 
unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application 
of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”). See generally Masooda Bashir et al., 
Online Privacy and Informed Consent: The Dilemma of Information Asymmetry, Ass’n for Info. Sci. & 
Tech (Feb. 24, 2016), https://asistdl.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/pra2.2015.145052010043 
(exploring the notion that most privacy policies and terms of service agreements are adhesion contracts 
and proposing ways to resolve this issue).
51. Simons v. Fried, 98 N.E.2d 456, 456 (N.Y. 1951).
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government intrusion.52 In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held in 2001 that using 
sense-enhancing technology53 to obtain information about a marijuana growing 
scheme inside a home, which would otherwise involve a “physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area,” constituted a search.54 The Kyllo Court was concerned 
about advancing technology and the effect it could have on the sanctity and privacy of 
the home, but did not consider the third-party doctrine per se.55 Yet, under that 
doctrine today, the government could essentially enter one’s home without a warrant 
by accessing third-party records created by smart devices inside, such as nanny cams 
or smart pet feeders; this access could prove to be a greater intrusion into the home 
than the sense-enhancing technology in Kyllo.56 Thus, given the nearly ubiquitous use 
of modern digital services and technologies, and the outdated nature of the third-
party doctrine, even the sanctity of the home may no longer be sufficiently protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.57
52. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate 
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”) (emphasis in original). The 
Court in Kyllo noted that there is a “minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged 
to be reasonable,” when it comes to searching one’s home without a warrant and to remove that minimum 
expectation “would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
53. Sense-enhancing technology is “used to enhance the human ability to observe or recognize physical 
characteristics or activities.” K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the 
Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 Yale J.L. & Tech. 123, 173 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
This type of technology often “can be further classified as those that amplify the existing human senses, or 
those that extend these senses by making previously undetectable phenomena observable.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). For example, binoculars, telescopes, cameras, drug sniffing dogs, and sensors that can hear 
through walls are devices that amplify human senses, while devices such as infrared or ultra-violet sensors, 
radars, and radio receivers are devices that extend the human senses. Id.
54. 533 U.S. at 34 (citation omitted). The government, suspecting that defendant Danny Kyllo was growing 
marijuana in his house, used a thermal imaging device to detect the amount of heat radiating from the 
house. Id. at 29. The device detected radiation amounts consistent with the use of high-intensity lamps 
required for growing marijuana indoors. Id. The government obtained a search warrant of Kyllo’s home 
in part because of the thermal imaging scans, and found an indoor marijuana growing operation. Id. at 
29–30.
55. See id. The holding in Kyllo was meant to preserve the degree of protection against government intrusion 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Id.
56. See Daniel Solove, 10 Reasons Why the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine Should be Overruled in 
Carpenter v. US, TeachPrivacy (Nov. 28, 2017), https://teachprivacy.com/carpenter-v-us-10-reasons-
fourth-amendment-third-party-doctrine-overruled [hereinafter 10 Reasons Why] (“[T]he home can be 
searched now through third party records, and that means the Fourth Amendment will increasingly 
cease to be much of a protection to privacy in the home.”); see, e.g., Privacy Policy for Nest Websites, Nest, 
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-policy-for-nest-web-sites/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2020) (disclosing that 
Nest will share personal information with third parties if it has a good faith belief that disclosing the 
information is reasonably necessary to meet any enforceable government request); see also, e.g., PetSmart 
Privacy Policy, PetSmart, https://www.petsmart.com/help/privacy-policy-H0011.html (last updated 
Dec. 2020) (disclosing that PetSmart collects, uses, and discloses information about users when they 
access or use the company’s websites, mobile applications, and other online products).
57. See Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits of the Third Party 
Doctrine, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1924, 1925 (May 9, 2017), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/
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IV. REPLACING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
 The Katz test “rests on the assumption that . . . the reasonable person has a well-
developed and stable set of privacy expectations.”58 However, dramatic technological 
changes may alter those expectations, resulting in a decreased sense of privacy in 
return for the increased accessibility that new technology brings.59 Consequently, 
technological development has required the Supreme Court to articulate new ways to 
protect individual privacy interests.60
 In Carpenter, the Court should have considered whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in digital real-time location data that creates a protected 
privacy interest despite third-party access to or possession of that data.61 Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s dissent in Carpenter provides a glimpse into what the world 
might look like without such protected interest.62 His argument that Carpenter 
lacked a privacy interest in CSLI data because the data was shared with a third party 
is troublesome, given the amount of information that is routinely—and sometimes 
unknowingly—handed to third parties.63
 I propose that the courts engage in a balancing analysis and take three questions 
into consideration when determining whether the government is authorized to obtain 
information via the third-party doctrine. The first question is whether obtaining 
third-party records infringes upon privacy inside the home.64 The current third-
party doctrine, as it relates to smart home devices, is not compatible with the 
historical notions of home privacy.65 The government should be required to obtain a 
uploads/2017/05/1924-1945_Online.pdf (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . . has not adequately 
evolved to compensate for the rapid explosion in both the quantity and sensitive quality of the 
information shared [with third parties].”).
58. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
59. See id. (“Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in f lux 
and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide 
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff 
worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology 
entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”) (footnote omitted).
60. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35; see also, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373–74 (2014) 
(discussing the mass of personal information often contained in a cell phone and holding that, absent 
exigent circumstances, searching the contents of a cell phone requires a warrant).
61. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (first citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 
(1979); and then citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)); see also Solove, supra note 9 
(“Carpenter would have been the ideal case to get rid of the Third Party Doctrine.”).
62. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2224 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“According to 
today’s majority opinion, the [g]overnment can acquire a record of every credit card purchase and phone 
call a person makes over months or years without upsetting a legitimate expectation of privacy.”).
63. See id. at 2230; see also McCubbin, supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Asay, supra note 11 and 
accompanying text.
64. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of 
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”).
65. See 10 Reasons Why, supra note 56 (noting that while the Supreme Court has consistently held that “the 
quintessential protection of the Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy in the home,” the development of 
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warrant to gain access to private information through smart home devices because 
the history and jurisprudence of the United States has always granted heightened 
protections to the sanctity and privacy of the home.66
 The second question is whether the government is using third-party records to 
track real-time physical location and movements via one’s cell phone.67 The government 
should be required to obtain a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, because—in the 
modern age—our cell phones are always with us, almost as an extension of the human 
body,68 which we take wherever we go.69 Furthermore, an individual’s location may be 
tracked even after they turn off their phone’s location services.70 Warrantless access to 
a phone’s every location thus impinges on an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy because our society’s expectation has always been that government agents 
cannot secretly monitor every movement of an individual for a long period of time 
using traditional investigative techniques.71 The third-party doctrine should not allow 
the government to take advantage of any cell phone’s location services in a way that—
compared to more traditional investigative tools—is effortless, inexpensive, and 
smart homes and the current third-party doctrine means that “[t]he government no longer needs to enter a 
person’s home to learn about that person . . . [because all can] be learned from third party records”).
66. See U.S. Const. amend. III (protecting against quartering of soldiers in private homes without the 
owner’s consent); see also, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (recognizing that “[i]n the home, . . . all details are 
intimate details” and should be safe from government’s reach) (emphasis in original).
67. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (noting that “cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, 
and effortlessly compiled”); see also id. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)) 
(recognizing that a cell phone is “‘almost a feature of human anatomy’” that “tracks nearly exactly the 
movements of its owner”).
68. See id. at 2218. However, warrantless searches under exigent circumstances such as terrorist threats, active 
shootings, and child abductions should be permitted. See id. at 2223 (recognizing that specific threats 
justify a warrantless search of digital information that may reveal the physical location of an individual).
69. See id. at 2220 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385) (“[C]ell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a 
pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern 
society.”). Smartphones “tap into the wireless network several times a minute whenever their signal is 
on, even if the owner is not using one of the [many features of their] phone.” Id. at 2211. “As a result, in 
no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily assume the risk of turning over a comprehensive [record] 
of his [or her location or] physical movements.” Id. at 2220 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)). Thus, the privacy interests at stake outweigh the fact that 
information was disclosed to a third party. See id. at 2217 (holding that “an individual maintains a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements . . . captured through CSLI” 
and “the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to 
Fourth Amendment protection”).
70. See Ryan Nakashima, Google Tracks and Records Your Movements Even If You Turn Off Location History, 
L.A. Times (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-google-location-
tracking-20180813-story.html (explaining how, even with the “location history” setting off, phones are 
still tracking and recording the user’s location from web browsers and app activity). See also Carpenter, 
138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, 
texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking 
for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, 
there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”)
71. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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efficient, without first obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause, or without 
exigent circumstances.72
 The third question is whether the location-based data retrieved by the government 
reveals an individual’s physical location and movements by means other than through 
a cell phone’s location monitoring system. In this situation, courts should weigh 
three factors.
 The first factor is the voluntariness of a user’s location disclosure.73 Similar to CSLI 
records, which are generated for commercial purposes, certain records generated for 
other commercial purposes also require revealing one’s location, thus reducing the 
expectation of privacy under the Court’s outdated test.74 For example, using a debit 
card to withdraw money automatically reveals an individual’s location.75 Debit cards 
are a near-necessity for modern life, and since there is no other way to use a debit card 
without revealing your location, the disclosure is not voluntary.76 Therefore, the 
government should be required to obtain a warrant to access this information.77 
Similarly, browsing a dating website can track and store an individual’s location 
72. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (comparing the invasiveness of GPS monitoring and CSLI); see also 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring) (recognizing that surveilling Jones for four weeks 
without the “relatively easy and cheap” GPS device would have been “difficult and costly,” requiring “a 
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance”). GPS monitoring “provides an 
intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 
‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 
(quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
73. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (declining to extend the third-party doctrine to CSLI because “[c]ell phone 
location information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term” and therefore, such 
information is not “voluntarily” disclosed to the third party). Essentially, courts should determine whether 
the individual was forced to enter into a contract of adhesion in order to use the service or product. See 
Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 208 (Am. L. Inst. 2020) (defining a contract of adhesion).
74. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; see, e.g., Mastercard – Global Privacy Notice, Mastercard, https://www.
mastercard.us/en-us/vision/corp-responsibility/commitment-to-privacy/privacy.html (last visited Apr. 
13, 2021) [hereinafter Mastercard] (disclosing the various purposes for which Mastercard collects an 
individual’s “Personal Information,” including location); see also, e.g., Privacy Policy, Bumble, https://
bumble.com/privacy (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Bumble] (explaining the type of personal 
information collected and providing to whom such information could be disclosed).
75. See, e.g., Mastercard, supra note 74; see also, e.g., Visa, Visa Global Privacy Notice 1, https://usa.visa.
com/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/privacy-notice.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) 
[hereinafter Visa Notice] (disclosing that every time a Visa card is used, Visa receives the “date, time, 
location, and amount of the transaction and information about the merchant” and “geolocation 
information, browsing history and other information available via digital interactions” such as Visa 
“products, services, websites or apps”).
76. See Shelle Santana, Is the U.S. on Its Way to Becoming a Cashless Society?, Harv. Bus. Rev. (July 23, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/07/is-the-u-s-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-cashless-society (discussing the “rise of 
digital payments” and reporting that “findings suggest that the cashless trend is clear but nuanced”); see 
also Bashir et al., supra note 50, at 2 (“A lack of alternative service delivery models . . . or competition 
between providers can undermine the degree of voluntariness of users’ consent.”).
77. Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18, 2220 (concluding that a warrant is required to obtain an 
individual’s CSLI data because the data “is not truly ‘shared’” and the amount of information revealed 
permits the government to “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts,” presenting an “even 
greater privacy concern[]”), with Visa Notice, supra note 75 (recording the user’s location every time 
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information, allowing the government to access that data per the third-party doctrine; 
that too should require a warrant to satisfy Fourth Amendment protections.78 Such 
location disclosures are required if one wants to remain engaged with modern society, 
and are therefore involuntary.
 The second factor is whether the tracking is facilitated by (1) a rudimentary 
device capable of tracking for a short period of time, such as a battery-operated 
beeper, or (2) a more comprehensive mode of surveillance capable of tracking for a 
longer period of time, such as twenty-four-hour video surveillance.79 If the former is 
used, then the third-party doctrine can apply because short-term tracking makes 
privacy a lesser concern.80 However, if the electronic surveillance is more sophisticated 
and used for a longer period,81 then the third-party doctrine should not apply because 
it is more likely to infringe on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.82 In 
such instances, and absent exigent circumstances, the government should be required 
to obtain a warrant.83
they use their Visa card). Using a debit card thus falls into the contract of adhesion category. See 
Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 208.
78. Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18, 2220, with Bumble, supra note 74 (informing users that their 
collected information will be disclosed to the government when it is requested). Thus, accessing dating 
sites also falls into the contract of adhesion category. See Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 208.
79. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy standard with respect 
to surveillance tools used in precedent); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, 
J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983) (holding that a warrant was not required 
to monitor and follow signals from a beeper placed in a drum of chloroform that was being transported 
to a drug lab by the defendant). The Court in Knotts noted that the beeper signals revealed nothing 
more than what would have been observed by a police car following the vehicle containing the drum and 
beeper. Id. at 285. Additionally, it noted that nothing in the record indicated that the government was 
continuously monitoring the beeper signals after the signals indicated that the drum was no longer 
moving; there was “no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the 
movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye 
from outside the cabin.” Id. at 284–85.
81. It is clear that seven days of CSLI data and four weeks of GPS tracking require warrants, but aside from 
those parameters, the Court has yet to identify the maximum length of time for which the government 
may obtain an individual’s location without a warrant. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2266–67 (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting) (citing the majority opinion) (“The Court declines to say whether there is any sufficiently 
limited period of time ‘for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical [location 
information] free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny’ . . . [but] seven days’ worth of information does 
trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny . . . .”) (emphasis in original) (alterations in original); see also Jones, 
565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the 
tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”).
82. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (first citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; then citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 
430 (Alito, J., concurring); and then citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)) 
(recognizing that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in their location information 
knowingly shared with another, but “more pervasive tracking” and “longer term” GPS monitoring 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
83. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281) (noting that different “‘constitutional 
principles may be applicable’” if the suspect was undergoing twenty-four-hour surveillance). “Prior to the 
digital age, [the government may] have pursued a suspect for a [limited duration] but doing so ‘for any 
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 The third factor to consider is the nature of the information the third party 
collects.84 If it encompasses only limited types of data, then the individual’s privacy 
interests are not as salient, and the government need not obtain a warrant.85 For 
example, information disclosed to a prospective employer for purposes of obtaining 
employment would be considered limited data. However, if the third party will 
potentially hold an exhaustive chronicle of location information, the government 
should be required to obtain a warrant.86
V. CONCLUSION
 The Founders could not have fathomed the nature and volume of information 
potentially exposed to remote access by the government.87 As technology rapidly 
evolves, so do our privacy notions.88 We can no longer rely on outdated understandings 
of privacy, like the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the third-party 
doctrine, to adequately effectuate Fourth Amendment protections in an era when we 
must share immeasurable amounts of personal data with third parties to partake in 
modern life.89 With every movement we make while holding our cell phones or wearing 
extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.’” Id. at 2217 (quoting 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring)). Therefore, “society’s expectation has been that law 
enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual[] . . . for a very long period of time.” Id. (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring)).
84. See id. at 2219 (first citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 392 (2014); and then citing United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)) (acknowledging that while the third-party doctrine partly derives from 
the idea that “an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with 
another,” “the fact of ‘diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out 
of the picture entirely’ . . . [i]nstead, [precedent] considered ‘the nature of the particular documents 
sought’ to determine whether ‘there is a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning their contents’”).
85. Compare id. at 2217 (declining to extend the third-party doctrine to CSLI data because it provides “an 
all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts” which reveals “an intimate window into a person’s 
life”), with Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276–77 (extending the third-party doctrine to the government’s use of a 
beeper to track a vehicle’s movement).
86. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (addressing the limited types of data that were collected in precedent 
applying the third-party doctrine); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hen 
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public 
movements[,] . . . I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded 
and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political 
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”).
87. See Brian Frazelle & David Gray, What the Founders Would Say About Cellphone Surveillance, ACLU 
(Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/what-founders-
would-say-about-cellphone-surveillance (arguing that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to 
protect against “the government’s capacity to freely exploit . . . new technologies to monitor and control 
‘the people’”); see also Arango, supra note 15 (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219) (noting that when the 
Court created the third-party doctrine in 1976, “it was impossible for any judge—even Supreme Court 
justices—to appreciate how society’s reliance on technology would create a ‘seismic shift’ in the 
doctrine’s reach”).
88. See Wolff, supra note 46.
89. See id.
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our smart watches, making online purchases or browsing dating sites, using navigation 
or smart home devices, we—knowingly or not—convey information to third parties 
that, either alone or in aggregate, reveal our private, personal details.90 Although the 
third-party doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, 
the Court has never explicitly held that this exception applies if an individual retains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their data.91 To ensure that the government does 
not have unfettered access to the voluminous electronic information that we disclose to 
third parties in our daily lives, the third-party doctrine should yield to a modern 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.
90. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Villasenor, supra note 4 and accompanying 
text.
91. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“[T]his Court has never held that the Government may subpoena 
third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
